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This paper argues that the sharing economy—through
the use of the Internet and real time reputational feedback
mechanisms—is providing a solution to the lemons problem
that many regulators have spent decades attempting to overcome. Section I provides an overview of the sharing economy
and traces its rapid growth. Section II revisits the lemons
theory as well as the various regulatory solutions proposed
to deal with the problem of asymmetric information. Section
III discusses the relationship between reputation and trust
and analyzes how reputational incentives affect commercial
interactions. Section IV discusses how information asymmetries were addressed in the pre-Internet era. It also discusses
how the evolution of both the Internet and information systems (especially the reputational feedback mechanisms of
the sharing economy) addresses the lemons problem. Section V explains how these new realities affect public policy
and concludes that asymmetric information is not a legitimate rationale for policy intervention in light of technological changes. We also argue that continued use of this rationale to regulate in the name of consumer protection
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A reputation for being “sound” is a valuable asset,
and we should expect people to make every effort to
get it.
—Gordon Tullock1
[C]ompetition is in a large measure competition for
reputation or good will.
—F. A. Hayek2
One traditional argument for government regulation is that information deficiencies or “asymmetries” create market failures.3 In
his oft-cited paper “The Market for Lemons,”4 George Akerlof describes why these information asymmetries prevent certain mutually
beneficial exchanges from taking place. Analyzing the used car market, Akerlof explains that used car buyers know that “lemons” exist
but are unable to distinguish them from higher quality cars, and they
are therefore less willing to pay.5 The buyers’ uncertainty, in turn,
discourages sellers of higher-quality cars from offering their cars for
sale, making both buyers and sellers worse off.6
Akerlof provides several solutions to such information-based
uncertainty, including guarantees, branding, chains, and licensing.7
He notes, however, that while trust is important, if such trust-building mechanisms are lacking, the market will suffer.8 Many economists and public policymakers have since taken this idea of asymmetric information as a chief justification for consumer protection
regulations, such as food labels or product safety warnings.9

1

Gordon Tullock, Adam Smith and the Prisoners’ Dilemma, 100 Q. J.
ECON.1073, 1078 (Supp. 1985).
2
F. A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 109 (1948).
3
See SUSAN E. DUDLEY & JERRY BRITO, REGULATION: A PRIMER 13 (2nd
ed. 2012).
4
George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and
the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970).
5
Id. at 489–90.
6
Id.
7
Id. at 499–500.
8
Id. at 500.
9
Joshua D. Wright, The Antitrust/Consumer Protection Paradox: Two Policies at War with Each Other, 121 YALE L.J. 2216, 2222, 2222 n.20 (2012).
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What is overlooked in much of the “lemons” literature and the
corresponding policy debates is the fact that every information problem also represents an entrepreneurial opportunity.10 In fact, discrepancies in information and dispersed knowledge drives economic
activity by elucidating opportunities for entrepreneurs to broker relevant information.11 Where information deficiencies or asymmetries
exist, entrepreneurs typically seize the opportunity to offer important innovations.12 Trial-and-error experimentation and increased rivalry lead to better ways of doing things and help to remedy information deficiencies or asymmetries.13
Importantly, reputational incentives and reputational feedback
mechanisms have also increasingly helped market actors overcome
information asymmetries.14 These mechanisms have always existed,
but they were somewhat crude in the past. However, the Internet and
information revolution have alleviated concerns about information
deficiencies.15 With the recent explosion of the sharing economy,
robust reputational feedback mechanisms now help consumers solve
information problems and secure a greater voice in commercial interactions.16 With the advent of the sharing economy, many of these
mechanisms have been integrated into the platforms connecting
buyers and sellers.17
This paper argues that the sharing economy—through the use of
the Internet and real time reputational feedback mechanisms—is
providing a solution to the lemons problem that many regulators
have spent decades attempting to overcome. Section I provides an
overview of the sharing economy and traces its rapid growth. Section II revisits the lemons theory as well as the various regulatory

10

See ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, COMPETITION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 155
(1973); see also Christopher Koopman, Matthew Mitchell & Adam Thierer, The
Sharing Economy and Consumer Protection Regulation: The Case for Policy
Change, 8 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 529, 533 (2015).
11
KIRZNER, supra note 10, at 155.
12
Id.
13
Koopman et al., supra note 10, at 539.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 539–42.
17
Id. at 541.
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solutions proposed to deal with the problem of asymmetric information. Section III discusses the relationship between reputation
and trust and analyzes how reputational incentives affect commercial interactions. Section IV discusses how information asymmetries
were addressed in the pre-Internet era. It also discusses how the evolution of both the Internet and information systems (especially the
reputational feedback mechanisms of the sharing economy) addresses the lemons problem. Section V explains how these new realities affect public policy and concludes that asymmetric information is not a legitimate rationale for policy intervention in light of
technological changes. We also argue that continued use of this rationale to regulate in the name of consumer protection might, in fact,
make consumers worse off. This has ramifications for the current
debate over regulation of the sharing economy.
I. THE RAPID EVOLUTION OF THE SHARING ECONOMY
Before discussing how reputational feedback systems help create trust among economic actors in the modern economy and alleviate earlier concerns about information asymmetries, it is important
to define the nature and extent of recent innovations in the sharing
economy. We begin by noting that definitions in this area continue
to evolve rapidly. While “there is no universally accepted definition
of the ‘sharing economy,’” Koopman, Mitchell, and Thierer argue
that “it is helpful to think of the sharing economy” as a broader classification for any marketplace that uses the Internet to “bring[] together distributed networks of individuals to share or exchange otherwise underutilized assets.”18 Defining the phenomenon in this way
then “encompasses all manner of goods and services shared or exchanged for both monetary and nonmonetary benefit.”19 In this paper, we will use the term in this manner.
Regardless of the terms used to describe it, the market actors
making up the sharing economy are radically transforming many aspects of the international economy. The sharing economy is generating an estimated $15 billion in global revenues today, and this

18
19

Id. at 531.
Id.
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number is projected to grow to $335 billion by 2025.20 The sharing
economy’s rental market for goods such as houses, cars, and machinery—dominated by firms such as Airbnb, TaskRabbit, and RelayRides—has an estimated worth in the tens of billions of dollars.21
The ride-sharing market, which includes firms such as Uber and
Lyft, and their respective valuations of $40 billion and $700 million,22 is rapidly disrupting traditional taxi and transportation services in cities across America, leading to a heated debate about its
regulation.23
The rapid ascendancy of the sharing economy challenges traditional economic theory and corresponding regulatory regimes in important ways. The sharing economy has brought about quick, radical
changes to the ways individuals transact, and both regulators and
economists are still trying to understand its impact.24 However, as
Jason Tanz of Wired magazine notes, one clear consequence has
already emerged.25 The sharing economy has resulted in greater trust
between strangers, a precondition to successful economic exchange:
“Many of these companies have us engaging in behaviors that would
have seemed unthinkably foolhardy as recently as five years ago.”26

20

Ashley Kindergan, Credit Suisse: By 2025, Companies Could Rake in $335
Billion a Year from People ‘Sharing’, BUSINESS INSIDER (Nov. 16, 2015, 7:13
PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/credit-suisse-sharing-economy-revenue335-billion-by-2025-2015-11; see also Koopman et al., supra note 10, at 530–31.
21
Koopman, supra note 10, at 530–31; Tomio Geron, Airbnb and the Unstoppable Rise of the Share Economy, FORBES (Jan. 23, 2013, 7:00 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2013/01/23/airbnb-and-the-unstoppable-rise-of-the-share-economy/.
22
Serena Saitto, Uber Valued at $40 Billion in $1.2 Billion Equity Funding,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 4, 2014, 12:21 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201412-04/uber-valued-at-40-billion-with-1-2-billion-equity-fundraising.html; Douglas MacMillan & Evelyn M. Rusli, Ride-Sharing App Lyft Is Valued at More Than
$700 Million, WALL STREET J. (Mar. 8, 2014, 4:11 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/03/08/ride-sharing-app-lyft-is-valued-at-more-than-700-million.
23
Brian Doherty, Smartphones vs. Taxi Drivers, REASON (Oct. 28, 2014, 8:30
AM), http://reason.com/archives/2014/10/28/smartphones-vs-taxi-drivers.
24
Jason Tanz, How Airbnb and Lyft Finally Got Americans to Trust Each
Other, WIRED (Apr. 23, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/04/trustin-the-share-economy.
25
Id.
26
Id.
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This development has ramifications for both economic theory
and public policy. Specifically, a growing reliance on reputational
feedback systems in market transactions calls into question many of
the current consumer protection regulations based on the lemons
theory, as well as the notion that asymmetric information requires
extensive government intervention in certain aspects of the economy.
II. THE LEMONS PROBLEM REVISITED: AKERLOF’S THEORY AND
SOME RESPONSES
Traditionally, many economists have recognized that the difficulty of distinguishing good quality from bad is inherent in all types
of transactions, and they have worried about the existence of information asymmetries concerning quality between producers and consumers as well as the resulting moral hazard problems. This concern
was articulated most notably in 1970 by George A. Akerlof in The
Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism.27 Akerlof was eventually awarded a Nobel Prize for his contributions to the economics of information.28
Akerlof argues that when sellers have more information about
products than the potential buyers, as, for example, in a used car
market, then the lower quality cars (lemons) would crowd out those
of higher quality because uncertainty among buyers would depress
the average value of used cars.29 The lemons problem suggests that
used cars tend to command a lower market price because potential
buyers are unable to tell whether a used car is good or bad.30 As a
consequence, sellers of higher-valued cars exit the market, and only
lemons are offered.31 The market may eventually collapse because
of this ongoing adverse selection process.32 Akerlof, describing the
information problems inherent with purchasing a car in the 1970s,
27

Akerlof, supra note 4, at 488.
George A. Akerlof - Facts, NOBELPRIZE.ORG, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2001/akerlof-facts.html
(last visited Jan. 5, 2016).
29
Akerlof, supra note 4, at 489–90.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 490
28
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concluded, “[i]t is impossible for a buyer to tell the difference between a good car and a bad car. . . . [or] even obtain the expected
value of a new car.”33 Therefore, sellers have to accept low prices
for higher-quality cars because buyers have trouble distinguishing
between low and high-quality secondhand vehicles.34
These information asymmetries also create moral hazard problems. In a transaction characterized by asymmetric information, the
moral hazard is “the tendency of the better[-]informed party to exploit [these asymmetries] in an undesirable or dishonest way.”35 As
George Akerlof observed, “dishonest dealings tend to drive honest
dealings out of the market.”36 In particular, in addition to a diminished willingness to pay, there is an increased likelihood that sellers
will exploit these information asymmetries to pass lemons off as
plums, which will also drive plums—and honest sellers—out of the
used car market.37
It is important to note that Akerlof himself recognized the role
that both government and private institutions could play to address
information asymmetry:
It should also be perceived that in these markets social and private returns differ, and therefore, in some cases, governmental intervention may increase the welfare of all parties. Or private institutions may arise to take advantage of the potential increases in welfare which can accrue to all parties.38
While he admits that private institutions may arise, he discounts
or disregards many historical examples of trust-based reputations
mechanisms developed to overcome information asymmetries. He
could predict neither the degree to which trust-based reputational
mechanisms would continue to ameliorate the lemons problem nor
the degree to which the entrepreneurial element would outperform
formal government mechanisms. As we discuss below, the Internet,
and the corresponding reputational feedback mechanisms that have
33

Id. at 489.
Id.
35
Alex Tabarrok & Tyler Cowen, The End of Asymmetric Information, CATO
UNBOUND (Apr. 6, 2015), http://www.cato-unbound.org/2015/04/06/alex-tabarrok-tyler-cowen/end-asymmetric-information.
36
Akerlof, supra note 4, at 495.
37
See id.
38
Id. at 488.
34
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developed, lowers the costs of acquiring historically costly information prior to engaging in what would otherwise be uncertain
transactions, resolving much of Akerlof’s lemons problem.
Since its publication in 1970, many economists have come to
challenge some of the central conclusions drawn from Akerlof’s paper. For example, in response to the claim that information asymmetries can result in the failure of markets, George Mason University economist Dan Klein argues that “[f]reedom to engage in selfdisclosure and competitive exposé is one of the freedoms that make
just the reverse true.”39 Within markets, solutions to information
asymmetries often emerge. Leveraging feedback mechanisms to
garner relevant information, building a reputation, and extending
trust based on the reputations of others can crowd out those exchanges based on information uncertainty.40
Building on Akerlof’s lemons problem, others have argued that
these information asymmetries lead to distortions in people’s behaviors, and “to the extent that parties are misinformed or uninformed,
they are less likely to be able to behave in accord with their true
preferences, and hence the market fails.”41 Others, however, have
come to realize that dispersed knowledge may not contribute to
these feared outcomes to the extent that many believed decades ago.
Nobel Prize–winning economist Vernon Smith, for example, recognized that dispersed knowledge is the driving force of exchange and
innovation.42 He notes,
“[M]arkets” are about recognizing that information is dispersed
in all social systems, and that the problem of society is to find, devise and discover institutions that incentivize and enable people to
make the right decisions without anyone having to tell them what to
do.43

39

Daniel B. Klein, Trust for Hire: Voluntary Remedies for Quality and
Safety, in REPUTATION: STUDIES IN THE VOLUNTARY ELICITATION OF GOOD
CONDUCT 97, 120 (Daniel B. Klein ed., 2000).
40
See Koopman, supra note 10, at 541.
41
R. Ted Cruz & Jeffrey J. Hinck, Not My Brother’s Keeper: The Inability of
an Informed Minority to Correct for Imperfect Information, 47 HASTINGS L. J.
635, 640 (1996).
42
RANDY T. SIMMONS, BEYOND POLITICS: THE ROOTS OF GOVERNMENT
FAILURE 7 (2011).
43
Id.
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It is important to analyze the performance of formal and informal institutions in the coordination of this dispersed, asymmetric information in order to shape policy decisions regarding the emerging
sharing economy. By definition, dispersed knowledge creates information asymmetries; however, markets also incentivize entrepreneurs to develop mechanisms to coordinate this dispersed
knowledge.44 Section III will focus on some of the Internet-based
mechanisms that have arisen to fulfill this role.
Furthermore, much of the current application of the lemons
problem does not emphasize the importance of incentives facing
both the consumer and the buyer. As Nobel Prize–winning economist George Stigler demonstrated, buyers will seek all information
available to them up until the point that the search costs exceed the
value of the information.45 Many regulations concerning the lemons
problem ignore the fact that buyers demand relevant information
and thus provide the incentive for feedback mechanisms to arise in
the long run. The buyer has a strong incentive to get as much information about a product as possible.46 Ways the buyer can acquire
this information include consulting a third party for external verification, seeking out a reputable seller, bringing a knowledgeable
friend along, or conducting the research themselves. Entrepreneurs
are incentivized to facilitate these mechanisms.47
Akerlof underestimated the power of the incentives facing entrepreneurs as well. In his view, “[t]he problem, of course, is that
entrepreneurship [in identifying quality] may be a scarce resource;
no development text leaves entrepreneurship unemphasized.”48 The
degree to which the entrepreneur can address information asymmetries in the context of online reputational mechanisms has called into
question whether the lemons problem will persist.49

44

See Koopman, supra note 10, at 533.
George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213, 216
(1961).
46
See Akerlof, supra note 4, at 495.
47
See Koopman, supra note 10, at 533.
48
Akerlof, supra note 4, at 496.
49
See Koopman, supra note 10, 539–44; Mark Steckbeck & Peter Boettke,
Turning Lemons into Lemonade: Entrepreneurial Solutions to Adverse Selection
Problems in E-Commerce, in MARKETS, INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION:
45

840

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:830

Finally, Peter Boettke and Mark Steckbeck argue that the fear of
information asymmetries ignores the robustness of markets, and that
markets continue to function even when the underlying conditions
are not ideal.50 And ultimately, as Nobel Prize–winning economist
Friedrich Hayek notes, market failures may well be corrected by
competitive solutions and private institutions.51 We argue that a private market solution has presented itself in the form of the information revolution, online reputational and trust-building mechanisms, and the lower search costs of an interconnected world. Therefore, government interventions justified on the basis of information
asymmetries must be reevaluated. When this view of competition—
held also by Israel Kirzner and Ludwig von Mises—is adopted, information asymmetry is not a market failure, but rather a market
opportunity.52
III. TRUST, REPUTATION, NORMS, AND MARKET DYNAMISM:
HISTORICAL RESPONSES TO INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES
“Akerlof’s premise is correct in that” human nature will produce
suboptimal behavior when there is a lack of any effective and efficient mechanism to induce cooperation among buyers and sellers.53
However, Akerlof’s model failed to adequately account for the
emergent use of mechanisms such as trust and reputation, as well as
social norms, to ameliorate the coordination failure resulting from
such asymmetries.54 In this section, we discuss how social norms,
trust, and reputation have been used throughout history to lay the
foundation for economic exchange.

AUSTRIAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE INTERNET ECONOMY 218, 219 (Jack Birner &
Pierre Garrouste eds., 2004).
50
Steckbeck & Boettke, supra note 49, at 219.
51
Id. at 219–20; see generally HAYEK, supra note 2, at 97.
52
See, for example, KIRZNER, supra note 10, at 217; see generally LUDGWIG
VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS 275–76, 278–79 (Bettina Bien Greaves ed., 2010); ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, MARKET THEORY AND THE
PRICE SYSTEM 14, 115 (Peter J Boettke & Frédéric Sautet eds., 2011) [hereinafter
KIRZNER, MARKET THEORY].
53
See Steckbeck & Boettke, supra note 49, at 221.
54
Id. at 218–19.

2016] HOW THE INTERNET, THE SHARING ECONOMY, AND REPUTATIONAL
FEEDBACK MECHANISMS SOLVE THE "LEMONS PROBLEM"
841

A. The Relationship between Reputation and Trust: From the
Maghribi Traders to the New York Diamond Trade
As Hayek explains in The Use of Knowledge in Society, the fundamental economic problem society faces is the question of how to
achieve cooperation between individuals with dispersed, and often
asymmetric, knowledge.55 Market actors use trust and reputational
mechanisms to facilitate transactions.56 In transactions among impersonal agents, trust becomes an even more crucial component of
cooperation because “a buyer’s trust in a seller’s credibility reduces
perceived transaction-specific risks, allowing the seller to obtain
price premiums.”57 And devising trust-based reputational mechanisms throughout history has allowed for a greater volume of efficient transactions between impersonal agents over a wider variety
of lower-cost goods and across geographic, linguistic, and cultural
barriers.58 These mechanisms can also complement or act as a substitute for formal enforcement mechanisms.
The use of trust and reputation to overcome information asymmetries can be traced at least as far back as the 11th century.59 A
group of Mediterranean traders, known as the Maghribi traders, provide one example of how groups have found their own solutions to
the problems of asymmetric information.60 The Maghribi traders operated throughout the Mediterranean, achieving efficiency by using
agents rather than traveling themselves.61 However, they also faced
55
F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519,
519–20 (1945).
56
See Sulin Ba & Paul A. Pavlou, Evidence of the Effect of Trust Building
Technology in Electronic Markets: Price Premiums and Buyer Behavior, 26 MIS
Q. 243, 244–48 (2002).
57
Ba & Pavlou, supra note 56, at 248.
58
See, e.g., Avner Greif, Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 857 (1989) [hereinafter Greif,
Reputation and Coalitions] (examining “the ‘coalition,’ an economic institution
based upon a reputation mechanism utilized by Mediterranean traders [during the
eleventh century] to confront the organizational problem associated with the exchange relations between merchants and their overseas agents”).
59
See id. at 858–59; Avner Greif, Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition, 83 AM. ECON. REV.
525, 528, 530 (1993) [hereinafter Greif, Contract Enforceability].
60
See Greif, Reputation and Coalitions, supra note 58, at 863.
61
Id.
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asymmetric information and moral hazard problems (i.e., it was easy
for these agents to abscond with the capital or cheat the merchants
as they operated in far-off markets) that could not be remedied
through the existing legal system.62 As a result, these traders built
reputational mechanisms that allowed them to condition future employment on past conduct, and they ostracized those who cheated
through concerted refusals to deal by the entire network of traders.63
These reputational mechanisms worked because they allowed the
traders to rely on the credible past experiences of others to help them
determine with whom they would deal in the future.64 In the context
of recurring transactions, those with positive reputations were rewarded with increased business and those with negative reputations
were not.65
The role that trust and reputation play in ordering social cooperation has always been an important, but often overlooked, factor in
how the market process actually works.66 Various forms of reputational mechanisms have developed in order for people to more efficiently communicate judgments and experiences with one another,
and to make decisions about whom to trust and what to believe.67 As
Adam Smith observed in 1759 in The Theory of Moral Sentiments,
“[w]e desire both to be respectable and to be respected,” and people’s success in life, he continued, “almost always depends upon the
favour and good opinion of their neighbours and equals; and without
a tolerably regular conduct, these can very seldom be obtained. The
good old proverb, therefore, that honesty is the best policy, holds, in
such situations, almost always perfectly true.”68 Roughly 225 years
later, Gordon Tullock remarked,
62

Id. at 862–63.
Id. at 868.
64
Id. at 869.
65
Id. at 868; see Greif, Contract Enforceability, supra note 59, at 530.
66
See Paolo Massa, Trust It Forward: Tyranny of the Majority or Echo
Chambers?, in THE REPUTATION SOCIETY: HOW ONLINE OPINIONS ARE
RESHAPING THE OFFLINE WORLD 151, 151–52 (Hassan Masum & Mark Tovey
eds., 2011) (“Trust is a key element for society. Without trust, society could not
exist [] . . . .[T]rust has been shown to be positively correlated with economic
growth, well-being, and happiness, and negatively correlated with crime and corruption.”).
67
See id. at 159.
68
ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 84, 86 (1853 ed.
1759).
63
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A reputation for being “sound” is a valuable asset, and we should
expect people to make every effort to get it . . . .Where the market is
broad and there are many alternatives, you had better cooperate. If
you choose the noncooperative solution, you may find you have no
one to noncooperate with.69
Indeed, many voluntary trade associations continue to play a role
in providing trust-based reputational mechanisms.70 For example,
the New York Diamond Dealers Club—created in the early 20th
century—includes a rigorous admission process, an arbitration process with industry experts, and high standards for maintaining membership.71 Similar associations use coordinated refusals to deal in
order to sustain valuable reputational mechanisms.72 Merchants refuse to enter into contracts with dishonest firms and demand a risk
premium from those who have not lived up to their contracts.73
Many of these reputational mechanisms are horizontal restraints,
designed to address deficiencies in formal institutions (i.e., courts)
by threatening group boycotts of dishonest firms.74 Thus, the credible threat of coordinated punishment serves as a reputation-based
mechanism for ensuring fair dealing.75 The commercial negotiation
process across industries has facilitated the transfer of information
between cooperating parties. Over time, this process has been augmented to incorporate security deposits or collateral that can serve
in lieu of forthcoming trust.76
Reputation, then, is an essential factor in building trust among
others within the market; ultimately it allows for greater specialization of trade.77 Voluntary cooperation of both a commercial and
69

Tullock, supra note 1, at 1078, 1081.
See Barak D. Richman, The Antitrust of Reputation Mechanisms: Institutional Economics and Concerted Refusals to Deal, 95 VA. L. REV. 325, 332
(2009).
71
Id. at 332–33.
72
Id. at 341.
73
Id. at 331.
74
Id. at 329.
75
Id. at 331.
76
See Klein, supra note 39, at 102.
77
See John Duffy et al., Social Norms, Information, and Trust Among
Strangers: Theory and Evidence, 52 ECON. THEORY 669, 670 (2013) (stating
“[t]rust is a key element in sustaining specialization and trade.”).
70
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noncommercial nature is far more likely to take place when the parties involved in the transactions have a reasonable expectation that
they can trust the other parties to live up to their ends of the deal.78
Klein notes, howver, that interactions can be structured to lessen dependence on trust and increase the likelihood that a party will perform what they’ve promised.79 Thus trust and reputation can be “a
catalyst in many buyer-seller transactions, and it can provide buyers
with high expectations of satisfying exchange relationships.”80 Trust
is defined as “a disposition to engage in social exchanges that involve uncertainty and vulnerability, but that are also potentially rewarding.”81 In this way, trust is essential to the market process. It
depends on a person’s history of economic behavior and an understanding of his or her incentives for future cooperation.82 Trust acts
as an indicator of the future behavior of economic actors.83
Not everyone has adopted the view that reputation is an effective
means for inducing efficient market cooperation. Kenneth Arrow,
for example, has countered the claim that trust could serve as an effective economic asset or signal by describing trust and similar values, such as loyalty or truth telling, as externalities.84 He argues that
reputation and trust are not commodities that can be openly traded
on the market in any technically possible way.85 Daniel Klein, however, points out that there are entire services, such as the Better Business Bureau, that indeed make money by providing reputational
links.86 There is, in effect, a literal market for information.
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Arrow is certainly correct that trust is not openly traded like
other commodities.87 His arguments, however, miss the deeper coordination mechanisms at work. Reputational systems need not operate like a literal stock market to fulfill an invaluable social function. Trust remains an important asset that incentivizes particular
behaviors by both buyers and sellers.88 In particular, once an individual or firm “has established a solid reputation,” the risk of information asymmetry is no longer as costly to consumers.89 Basing decisions on a reputation may create a greater willingness among consumers to engage in transactions that might have been previously
considered too risky.90
The lemons problem is alleviated when buyers are able to rely
on the solid reputations of certain sellers to provide high-quality
products.91 Eric Goldman details how reputation and reputational
systems help solve asymmetric information problems and smooth
the market process by acting as a secondary invisible hand:
When information about producers and vendors is costly, reputational information can improve the operation of the invisible hand
by helping consumers make better decisions. In this case, reputational information acts like an invisible hand of the invisible hand
(an effect I call the secondary invisible hand) because reputational
information can guide consumers to make marketplace choices that
in aggregate enable the invisible hand. Thus, in an information economy with transaction costs, reputational information can play an essential role in rewarding good producers and punishing poor ones.92
Indeed, by lowering the transaction costs of decision making and
information gathering, reputational mechanisms allow for more economic activity at the margin and promote innovation and further
gains from exchange.93 When the costs of acquiring information are
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reduced, and “the costs of making decisions and trades are reduced,
new opportunities can be [sought out and] exploited.”94
“Reputation, or the fear of its loss,” can act as a powerful incentive to both “constrain[] opportunistic behavior” and incentivize
honest transactions among individuals within the market.95 Reputation aids private institutions in overcoming asymmetric information
problems.96 Reputational constraints, like “religious or ethical constraints,” prevent individuals from lying and cheating by making
such behavior “very costly” in the market.97
As noted in the examples of the Maghribi traders and the Diamond Dealers Club, reneging on a promise puts one’s reputation—
and future income—at risk.98 Likewise, individuals are rewarded for
honest dealings.99 Reputation elicits cooperation, acts as an enforcement mechanism, signals trustworthiness or quality, mitigates risks,
incentivizes good behavior, punishes bad behavior, and aids in resolving information asymmetry.100 Social norms also work to complement reputation in regulating human behavior.101
B. The Relationship between Reputation and Social Norms:
Shasta County, California
The use of reputational mechanisms also plays a much deeper
role in how individual actions are coordinated. Cass Sunstein argues
that “[s]ocial norms are a key determinant in [the] reputational benefit[s] or cost[s]” of individual actions.102 Sunstein defines norms as
“social attitudes of approval and disapproval, specifying what ought
to be done and what ought not to be done.”103 These social norms,
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and corresponding social sanctions, often act as powerful regulators
of behavior.104 Sunstein notes,
[S]ocial norms are enforced through social sanctions . . . .[These] sanctions create a range of unpleasant (but sometimes pleasant) emotional states in [the minds of] people who have
violated norms. If someone behaves in a way inconsistent with social norms, public disapproval may produce embarrassment or perhaps shame and a desire to hide.105
And, as Sunstein explains, the costs of violating social norms
can be quite high because the unpleasant feelings brought about are
intense, and the social consequences can be profound.106 In some
cases, norms rather than formal legal rules dictate how individuals
will interact with one another.107
As Robert Ellickson famously observed in Shasta County, California, legal rule had no effect at all on the behavior of ranchers and
farmers with regard to liability for straying cattle in the mid-20th
century.108 Interactions among these neighbors were controlled by a
system of norms: a code having no connection to courts, legislatures,
or any other formal institution.109 As David Friedman explains,
When informed that one of his animals was trespassing, a
rancher is expected to apologize, retrieve the animal, and take reasonable precautions to keep it from happening again. If significant
damage has been done, the animal’s owner is expected to make up
for the damage. . . . If a rancher consistently lets his animals stray,
or fails to offer to make up for significant damages, the victim responds with gossip—spreading the word that the rancher is not behaving in a proper neighborly way. If that fails to work, the victim
may transport straying animals far away—imposing significant
costs on the owner who has to retrieve them.110
104
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Christine Bicchieri refers to these arrangements as “covenants
without swords.”111 She explains that “covenants are made and kept
even in the absence of obvious sanctions. The very act of promising
. . . might be enough to induce many of us to behave contrary to
narrow self-interest. A social norm has been activated, and, under
the right circumstances, we are prepared to follow it.”112 Bicchieri
goes so far as to call social norms “the grammar of society”:
[L]ike a collection of linguistic rules that are implicit in a language and define it, social norms are implicit in the operations of a
society and make it what it is. Like a grammar, a system of norms
specifies what is acceptable and what is not in a social group. And
analogously to a grammar, a system of norms is not the product of
human design and planning.113
Thus, whether they are born out of an obligation to keep promises, or to avoid punishment or social sanction, norms act as a powerful check on opportunistic behavior.114
And, much like the reputational mechanisms discussed above,
certain social norms can aid economic cooperation by rewarding
good behavior and sanctioning the bad.115 Bicchieri explains, “Social norms . . . often go against narrow self-interest, as when we are
required to cooperate, reciprocate, act fairly, or do anything that may
involve some material cost or the forgoing of some benefit.”116
These kinds of beneficial social norms work not only in those situations where there is a conflict of interest, but also in situations where
there is the potential for joint gain.117
Alongside reputational mechanisms, social norms lead to consistent behavioral patterns.118 In creating these patterns, norms allow
111
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individuals to develop expectations about another’s behavior and allow market actors to make predictions about quality in the face of
asymmetric information.119 This facilitates ongoing economic cooperation and allows more of the mutually beneficial exchanges that
ameliorate the lemons problem.120
C. Dynamic Competition and the Forgotten Entrepreneurial
Element: Modern Pre-Internet Solutions to Information
Asymmetries
While the role of reputation and social norms in commercial interactions may seem self-evident, the traditional “lemons problem”
downplays the potential for greater trust to develop among market
participants because asymmetric information problems will continue to persist.121 Yet, while the Internet has allowed for more trust
mechanisms and reputation-building than anyone could have predicted, the market has also been devising solutions to asymmetric
information problems.122
The driving force behind the rise of these mechanisms to solve
information asymmetry is the alertness of the entrepreneur to emerging market opportunities.123 Markets are not static; they are a dynamic process.124 And every perceived information problem also
creates an incentive for the entrepreneur to discover new ways to
create profit opportunities.125 By continually updating information
and experimenting through trial and error, the entrepreneur discovers more efficient means of promoting human interaction and facilitating exchange.126 Ultimately, as the entrepreneur takes advantage
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of these opportunities, the market process is driven toward equilibrium.127
In other words, information asymmetries represent entrepreneurial opportunities.128 As Hayek explains,
In actual life the fact that our inadequate knowledge
of the available commodities or services is made up
for by our experience with the persons or firms supplying them—that competition is in a large measure
competition for reputation or good will—is one of
the most important facts which enables us to solve
our daily problems. The function of competition is
here precisely to teach us who will serve us well.129
Indeed, dynamic competition allows consumers to distinguish
between those who will perform and those who will fail.130 It also
creates a strong financial incentive for individuals to overcome
problems and realize gains from exchange.131 Today’s market failures are simply tomorrow’s profit opportunities, and it is the dynamism of the market process that allows entrepreneurs to discover
how best to achieve the solutions.132
Even before the Internet and many other modern forms of information sharing discussed in the next section, individuals sought information regarding potential buyers and sellers, using various
methods to acquire the information they lacked.133 In response, the
market provided several reputational mechanisms, including methods as simple as getting to know people, reviewing prices, seeking
referrals, viewing “credentials and seals of approval,” participating
in a service trial, asking for a guarantee or a warranty, consulting a
neighbor or a third party, getting a second opinion, consulting “an

127
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information bureau or a rating organization,” trusting a middleman,
or doing their own research.134
Traditionally, one of the core functions of prices has been to
communicate the relative valuation of goods and products on the
market.135 Hayek explains that “in a system where the knowledge of
the relevant facts is dispersed among many people, prices can act to
coordinate the separate actions of different people.”136 Oftentimes,
buyers and sellers can use relative prices to understand a great deal
of information about the product or service in question without
needing to rely on costly searching methods.137
Akerlof suggests two counteracting institutions—guarantees
and brand names—that buyers use to derive information about products.138 These institutions have developed to allow higher-quality
products to compete with the lemons.139 Akerlof notes that “brand
names not only indicate quality but also give the consumer a means
of retaliation if the quality does not meet expectations.”140 This is
certainly true in the way consumers will make concerted efforts to
avoid particular brands for political, moral, and ethical reasons.141
In addition, like brand names, franchising extends trust over a network of associated services with a common reputation.142 Guarantees, warranties, and return policies help negate the effects of quality
uncertainty.143 These are institutions in which the risk is born by the
seller rather than by the buyer.144
Advertising is another way that relevant information is communicated to buyers.145 Stigler explains that, as a method of providing
134
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potential buyers with knowledge of the identity, and thus reputation,
of potential sellers, advertising is “an immensely powerful instrument for the elimination of ignorance.”146 Advertising can help educate consumers about the options at their disposal and about the
relative merits of each option.147
In addition to these mechanisms, the 20th century saw the rise
of third-party organizations that collect and disseminate information
to consumers, thus alleviating information asymmetry among buyers. Independent reviewers and watchdog groups grew to collect information about quality for interested parties, and they developed
effective means for communicating this information to those seeking it. Examples include consumer advocacy groups such as the
Consumers Union,148 the Better Business Bureau,149 and the National Consumers League;150 expert industry consultant services
such as the American Automobile Association (AAA);151 specialized product magazines and guides like Edmunds,152 Carfax,153 and
Kelley Blue Book154 for cars; and various other local product and
service reviewers. Many specialized information services related to
the car industry existed at the time Akerlof first explained the lemons problem.155 And approximately two decades after Akerlof described what he saw as major information asymmetries within the
market, Carfax began providing its car reports.156

146

Id.
Adam Thierer, Unappreciated Benefits of Advertising and Commercial
Speech, 86 MERCATUS ON POLICY 1, 2 (2011).
148
CONSUMERS UNION, http://consumersunion.org/ (last visited Feb. 12,
2016).
149
BETTER BUSINESS BUREAU, https://www.bbb.org/ (last visited Feb. 12,
2016).
150
NATIONAL CONSUMERS LEAGUE, http://www.nclnet.org/ (last visited Feb.
12, 2016).
151
AAA, http://www.aaa.com/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2016).
152
EDMUNDS, http://www.edmunds.com/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2016).
153
CARFAX, http://www.carfax.com/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2016).
154
KELLEY BLUE BOOK, http://www.kbb.com/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2016).
155
It is interesting to note, however, that Akerlof did not consider the existence of these reputational mechanisms in his criticism of asymmetric information
in the used car market. See Akerlof, supra note 4, at 489–92.
156
Carfax Corporate History, CARFAX, http://www.carfax.com/company/carfax-corporate-history (last visited Feb. 12, 2016).
147

2016] HOW THE INTERNET, THE SHARING ECONOMY, AND REPUTATIONAL
FEEDBACK MECHANISMS SOLVE THE "LEMONS PROBLEM"
853

Other third-party mechanisms used buyers as a source of information. For example, in the early 1990s, Prologue, a service of Consumer Health Services, connected people with medical practitioners
by mail and telephone.157 It relied on the feedback mechanism of
users filling out response cards in order to rate doctors.158 Prologue
used this information to recommend and refer customers to the best
doctors.159 Modern equivalents such as Zocdoc160 or WebMD161
continue to provide Internet-based referral services linking consumers to medical professionals based on their reputations.
As the market continues to grow in both the number of transactions and the number of economic actors, Stigler has predicted that
many of these firms will appear to collect costly information and sell
it to those who would otherwise be unable to acquire the information
in a cost-effective way.162
In addition to these information dealers, private certification and
accreditation bodies also act as signals about the quality of products
and services. For example, the Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval reveals information about the reliability of household products.163 Editor’s Choice awards signal the high quality of consumer
electronics products.164 Other third-party accreditation organizations include Moody’s credit rating services, and J. D. Power ratings
on consumer goods.165
157
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Labels also reveal information about reputation.166 Labels serve
as “mechanism[s] or institution[s] which systematically process[]
some information among community members.”167 One of the most
prevalent examples of this is Underwriters Laboratories, which began in 1901 as a safety certification company providing on-site
safety inspections both for factories and security systems, as well as
aiding in the development of product standards.168 By certifying
tested products with the UL label, Underwriters Laboratories has
become one of the best means of communicating desirable information to consumers regarding the merit of appliances and devices.
This information would otherwise have needed to be acquired
through costly means.169
Of course, there will always be some friction in the market process because some degree of information asymmetry will always be
present in an imperfect world.170 In fact, as Stigler demonstrates, individuals will only continue to search for information so long as the
marginal cost of each item exceeds the marginal benefit of possessing it.171 Invariably, there will be instances in which people will
remain uninformed.172 As Hayek explains, this is the “phenomena
with which we have to deal: the unavoidable imperfection of man’s
knowledge and the consequent need for a process by which
knowledge is constantly communicated and acquired.”173 Ultimately, as entrepreneurs discover new and effective ways to overcome these information gaps, information asymmetries between potential buyers and sellers will decrease as well.174
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IV. HOW THE INTERNET AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS SOLVE OLD
PROBLEMS
As noted above, markets are a dynamic—or evolutionary—process, where both established and emergent standards, tools, and
mechanisms deemed efficient today will nonetheless be supplanted
by newer, more efficient means tomorrow.175 And the market process emerges from trial-and-error experimentations, as entrepreneurs “discover more efficient means of promoting human interaction, thus facilitating exchange.”176 This same process has taken
place with the rise of the Internet and subsequent developments in
how information systems are used to solve old problems.177 Ongoing experimentation with online technologies and feedback systems
has helped alleviate information asymmetries.178
A. Early Internet Reputational Feedback Mechanisms
As previously discussed, reputational feedback mechanisms in
the form of product and service reviews, ratings, and awards have
existed for some time. With the advent of the Internet, many of these
services simply moved online, leveraging a wider audience and continuing to lower the transaction costs associated with acquiring pertinent information. For example, Consumer Reports still publishes
its print magazine, but all the reviews and ratings can now be found
online as well.179 Other product review sites are exclusively online;
one example is CNET, which primarily reviews electronics, software, and other technology products.180
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The next evolution in online feedback mechanisms was
prompted by average consumers—as opposed to professionals—rating products and services online.181 As Liangjun You and Riyaz Sikora note, “[o]nline opinion and consumer-review sites have dramatically changed the way consumers shop, enhancing or even supplanting traditional sources of consumer information such as advertising.”182 One of the largest sites utilizing online product feedback
is Amazon.com, where buyers rate individual items with a simple
five-star system as well as detailed reviews.183 These rating systems
have evolved into service review platforms such as Yelp, which allow customers to comment on and rate local businesses.184 Likewise, this has led to platforms such as TripAdvisor that provide a
forum where travelers offer tips and ratings for specific travel sites,
tourist spots, and hotels.185 Review and rating sites allow both professionals and amateurs to rate goods and services on platforms related to either general or hyper-specific interests.186 These sites perform the vital function of providing consumers with the information
they need before they engage in an exchange.187
The latest major evolution of online feedback mechanisms is the
two-way or interactive rating system, which was popularized by
eBay.188 While a one-way rating system is sufficient to decide which
item to buy on Amazon, it is not sufficient when interacting with
another unknown party, especially an individual rather than a company. Both eBay buyers and sellers have the option of leaving feedback for each other after a transaction, giving a positive, neutral, or
negative rating along with a short comment.189 Over time, eBay
181
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members develop a feedback profile, that is, a reputation score based
on other people’s comments and ratings.190 This is one of the most
powerful parts of sellers’ eBay profiles, and it can determine how
easily or at how high a price they can sell items.191 In fact, reputational systems have been found to both help avoid fraud and increase
buyer satisfaction.192 Moreover, Kevin Hoffman, David Zage, and
Cristina Nita-Rotaru note that “[n]ot only do reputation systems help
protect the buyer, but they have also been shown to reduce transaction-specific risks and therefore generate price premiums for reputable sellers.”193 Conversely, in some instances, sellers can demand
assurances from buyers with poor ratings with regard to their ability
to pay.194 It is these simple feedback systems that allow communities like eBay not only to operate but to thrive.195 Others also note
that
feedback systems, or reputation mechanisms, increase trust and trustworthiness among strangers engaging in commercial transactions. They provide
summarized histories of past behaviour, increasing
the opportunities of well-behaved participants, and
decreasing those of poorly-behaved ones. They thus
improve trust by rewarding cooperation.”196
The next section will explain how reputational systems have
grown even more sophisticated with the recent rise of the sharing
economy.
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B. Rise of the Sharing Economy and New Reputational Feedback
Mechanisms
The market for reputational mechanisms is active, robust, and
always adapting to new challenges. The sharing economy has
caused the development of new mechanisms at the same time old
ones have adapted to technological change. There are two general
types of online reputational mechanisms: centralized or third-party
mechanisms, and peer-to-peer mechanisms.197 They will be examined in order.
As Audun Jøsang, Roslan Ismail, and Colin Boyd note, trust and
reputation schemes cover a wide variety of applications and utilize
many different types of mechanisms.198 Therefore, “there is no single solution that will be suitable in all contexts and applications.”199
The key is to allow these mechanisms to compete in the market.200
Just as a competitive market in any other good or service will produce the most efficient result, a competitive market in online reputational mechanisms will allow those that provide the most accurate
or efficient mechanism to develop.201
1. CENTRALIZED OR THIRD-PARTY MECHANISMS
These mechanisms build trust in the centralized platform but not
necessarily trust between the two transacting parties. For example,
eBay has a money back guarantee that refunds buyers if they don’t
receive their item or the item they receive does not match the listing
description.202 This mechanism does not increase the buyer’s trust
in the actual seller, nor does it increase the seller’s personal reputation, but it does increase the level of comfort in the transaction.203 In
other words, the platform facilitating the transaction doesn’t merely
197
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connect buyers and sellers; it also acts as a third party seeking to add
trust and validity to the transactions.204 In contrast, an example of a
platform that only connects buyer and seller, offering no additional
value or assurance services, is Craigslist, the virtual equivalent of
the classifieds in traditional print newspapers.205
While eBay and Airbnb started primarily as a simple servicelisting platform, it soon became evident to both that adding services
and mechanisms to enhance trust in the transaction would be valuable to both parties. This frees people from having to critically evaluate each individual with whom they interact, thus lowering transaction costs. What these systems have in common is that they radically lower transaction costs by making hassle-free cooperation
among diverse parties easier than ever.
As previously mentioned, guarantees by centralized platforms
are fairly common. These are similar to the guarantees discussed
earlier where a party offers to refund the purchase price if the buyer
is unsatisfied. The only difference is that the seller previously provided the guarantee. For example, Maytag could offer a guarantee
on their washing machine. With a centralized platform connecting
independent buyers and sellers, the third-party platform, rather than
the seller, can offer the guarantee. This is an obvious benefit to buyers, as it lowers their potential risk and therefore the cost of the transaction.206 But it also benefits the sellers as the buyer will now be
willing to pay more.207 While providing a guarantee is a cost to the
third party, it also carries the benefit of increasing the number of
transactions on the platform, of which the third party usually gets a
percentage. Furthermore, it enhances the platform’s brand, leading
to further transactions and fee income.208
A similar mechanism offered by centralized platforms is insurance. The centralized platform may take out insurance policies on
either party of the transaction or on both. This lowers the risk for
either one of the transacting parties enough that they may now view
204
205
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the benefits as exceeding the costs. For example, the car-sharing
platform Turo allows those with underutilized cars to rent them to
those who need a car.209 The risks to the owner of the car are high:
Not only is their car at risk of damage, but an accident could incur
liability charges from third parties as well.210 To alleviate these
risks, Turo covers all vehicle owners with an additional $1 million
liability insurance policy to protect against third-party claims for injuries and property damage as well as insuring the car up to the actual cash value due to collision and “comprehensive” causes.211
Airbnb, the home-sharing platform, has a policy covering a host’s
residence up to $1 million against damage by guests.212
Centralized exchanges also use vetting and screening mechanisms to block questionable or untrustworthy users from even entering their platform in the first place. This can take many forms, depending on the service offered. One of the biggest concerns for ridesharing services is the safety of the riders. To block suspect drivers
from being listed in the first place, services like Lyft perform both
criminal and driving background checks.213 The criminal check will
exclude anyone with a record of violent crimes, sexual offenses,
theft, property damage, felonies, or drug-related offenses.214 The
driving check will exclude anyone with certain moving violations,
major violations (e.g., driving on a suspended license, reckless driving), and DUIs or other drug-related driving violations, as well as
more serious driving-related infractions (e.g., hit-and-runs, felonies
involving a vehicle).215 They will also confirm that the driver has a
valid driver’s license and personal insurance that meets state requirements. Screening can be done on the consumer of the product
or service as well; RelayRides will not allow people to rent cars from
others if they have any major violations on their driving record
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(DUI, DWI, speeding over 20 mph, etc.) or even more than one minor violation in the last year.216 Other forms of vetting can be more
subjective, such as Lyft’s Welcome Ride, also known as a personality check, where a seasoned Lyft driver must ride with a prospective
driver and approve them before they can begin driving for Lyft.217
There are also mechanisms to ensure that only qualified providers can participate in certain services.218 DogVacay, a service that
connects dog owners with dog lovers who will watch their dogs,
uses a system where prospective hosts must have their profiles approved before being listed as a dog sitter.219 Hosts can improve their
search result rankings (making it more likely people will hire them)
with badges earned by reading, watching training videos, and taking
tests to improve their dog care knowledge.220 Similar to the Lyft personality check, they can also earn a badge by undergoing a phone
interview with the company.221
Centralized platforms acting as a payment clearing system are
one of the oldest mechanisms used to facilitate transactions. When
the central platform clears or verifies the payment between a buyer
and a seller, neither party has to worry about things like fraudulent
checks.222 Further, there is no handling of cash by people like ridesharing drivers, which reduces their personal security risk.223 Es-
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crow services, used by sites such as eBay, offer an additional measure of security.224 For new eBay sellers who do not yet have a selling
record or reputation, eBay will automatically withhold payment
from completed sales for a number of days or until the buyer confirms that he or she received the item as expected and leaves feedback.225 A similar transaction can be used for high-priced items using Escrow.com, eBay’s official escrow service.226
“Big data” analytics is a relatively new mechanism that is unique
to online, centralized exchanges.227 These mechanisms use computer algorithms to monitor transactions and either block or flag suspicious activity that is then sent to a human employee to investigate.228 For example, Airbnb’s platform tracks almost every transaction element of someone booking a host’s room including the listing, profile, reservation, payment, all communication between the
prospective guest and host, and the follow-up review.229 Using this
information, Airbnb’s algorithms develop a “trust score” for each
reservation.230 If the trust score is too low, it is automatically flagged
for further investigation by their security team.231 Common items
the system can flag or block include messages that mention the
words “Western Union” (a sign the host is trying to circumvent
Airbnb’s payment system232); a host and guest repeatedly booking
rooms with each other (they may be trying to build up their reviews
or ratings through fake bookings); or a new user booking very expensive rooms with a new host (raising the possibility of a money
224
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laundering scheme).233 Airbnb undertakes such initiatives even
though no law or regulation demands it because platforms like
Airbnb possess the scale and incentive to build this infrastructure.234
Airbnb currently has a team of approximately 80 people, with backgrounds such as former government investigators and criminal prosecutors, who are constantly reviewing suspicious activity and finding new ways to combat fraud and abuse.235
To summarize, when it comes to centralized or third-party mechanisms, there are already a number of well-established mechanisms
in addition to emerging ones that are made possible by the advent of
big data and analytics.236 These mechanisms work well because the
third party is also a stakeholder in the transaction (usually because
they receive a percentage of the transaction) and therefore have
aligned interests to root out fraud and abuse.237 They also possess
the scale and resources to offer mechanisms—such as guarantees,
insurance, and even entire fraud investigation teams—that would be
too expensive for individual actors.238
While some may point out that these mechanisms do not directly
increase the trust between the transacting parties, the end result is
the same: Transactions that would not otherwise occur due to lack
of trust are indeed facilitated.239 This is similar to the way personal
referrals have worked in the traditional economy.240 Some people
may not at first trust Bob the plumber to repair a sink, but if all their
coworkers recommend him, then they may indeed choose to hire
him. In such a case, they are leveraging the coworkers and their
feedback as a third party, much as users leverage the network and
feedback of other users on a centralized platform.241 In the end, the
result is the same: The risk or cost of the transaction is lowered, allowing it to take place and creating value for both parties.242
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242

Tanz, supra note 24.
Id.
Id.
Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier, supra note 227, at 131.
See generally Tanz, supra note 24.
Id.
Jøsang, Ismail & Boyd, supra note 198, at 619.
Id. at 626.
Id. at 622.
Id. at 626.

864

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:830

2. PEER-TO-PEER MECHANISMS
The second major category of online reputational systems includes mechanisms that directly increase the trust between the two
parties involved in a transaction.243 These are feedback mechanisms
that are truly peer to peer in character.244 Even though a third-party
platform may make the existence of the mechanism possible, the
value is created by interactions between the two transacting parties.245 Before discussing these mechanisms, however, it should be
noted that trust and reputation schemes are used in varying ways in
a vast array of situations; there is no one-size-fits-all solution suitable for all times and all contexts.246
Ratings and reviews are one of the most popular peer-to-peer
feedback mechanisms, and they rely on what is often referred to as
collaborative sanctioning.247 These mechanisms have been around
since the Web’s earliest days with the rise of eBay and Amazon, and
they have already been discussed in detail previously.248 Therefore,
only a little elaboration is needed here.
Two important changes since the early days of web commerce
have made peer-to-peer feedback mechanisms more ubiquitous and
robust. First, the rise of Web 2.0 services over the past decade—
blogs, social networking platforms, smartphones and mobile apps—
have made it easier than ever for the public to have a voice in commercial and noncommercial transactions.249 Importantly, the geolocation technology embedded in many of these tools and platforms
adds another layer of accountability by making it easier for consumers and companies to interact and locate each other.250
These technological developments have encouraged companies
and other organizations (including governments) to become more
243
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responsive to consumer and citizen demands.251 Many organizations
also offer specific pages and social media services to address customer service concerns.252 In particular, Facebook and Twitter are
now frequent outlets for consumer complaints.253 Many consumers
take to Twitter or Facebook to complain about shoddy service or to
praise vendors.254 Many corporations have specific websites or
Twitter accounts specifically for this purpose.255
For example, in order to respond to consumer complaints
promptly, most airlines (both major and minor) have established a
presence on social media websites such as Twitter and Facebook, in
addition to YouTube and Instagram.256 As consumers and firms adjust to these platforms, companies are able to engage in a much
warmer relationship with their clientele.257 When things go wrong
for the customer, however, these mechanisms are also the best way
to get grievances resolved quickly and in real time.258 Twitter has
proven to be a particularly powerful tool for consumers to complain
about services and get prompt responses because of the public nature
of these posts and because such complaints are readily searchable
and sharable on the Internet.259 These feedback mechanisms also
help bolster the quality of service through intense competition and
constant innovation.
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A second major change since the early days of the Web is that
the recent explosion of the sharing economy—which depends upon
many of the ingredients just discussed—has enabled even more direct and instantaneous interaction between those supplying and demanding various services. The sharing economy relies heavily on
ratings and reviews, using everything from simple star or point systems to detailed reviews from users.260 For example, ride-sharing
companies employ some of the most extensive rating systems,
whereby both the rider and the driver use a five-star system to rate
each other after every ride.261 The companies can use the ratings to
select drivers, and drivers can use the ratings to decide whether to
accept riders. Companies like Lyft even have rules whereby drivers
whose average rating falls below 4.6 (out of 5) stars will be at risk
of being deactivated; similarly, a rider who rates a driver at three
stars or lower will never be matched with that driver again.262
In a peer-to-peer transaction, both parties attempt to gain information about the other.263 Humans use various forms of signaling
all of the time to try to convey something about their reputation or
trustworthiness.264 For example, bankers usually dress professionally and work in large, intimidating stone buildings to signal their
soundness and trustworthiness in handling peoples’ hard-earned
money. EBay sellers use multiple pictures in their listings, and
Airbnb will send a professional photographer to hosts’ homes to
showcase them appropriately.265
Many online sharing platforms encourage their users to communicate directly with each other through the platform, which has
been found to be a powerful way to gain trust and build reputations
in online transactions and communities.266 RelayRide stumbled
260

We Go the Extra Mile for Safety, supra note 213.
Id.
262
Id.
263
Tanz, supra note 24.
264
Jøsang, Ismail & Boyd, supra note 198, at 619.
265
Get Access to a Professional Photographer—It’s Free, AIRBNB,
https://www.airbnb.com/info/photography (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
266
Elinor Ostrom, A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of
Collective Action: Presidential Address, American Political Science Association,
1997, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1, 6 (1998) (providing an overview of some of the
experiment evidence showing that communication between parties permits substantial increases in their cooperation with one another).
261

2016] HOW THE INTERNET, THE SHARING ECONOMY, AND REPUTATIONAL
FEEDBACK MECHANISMS SOLVE THE "LEMONS PROBLEM"
867

upon this concept accidentally when they changed the way they
transferred car keys from owner to renter.267 When the company first
started, they had membership-card readers installed in every
owner’s car.268 Renters could unlock and start a car by swiping their
membership card, thus eliminating the need for the car owner to be
present.269 But it soon became clear to RelayRide that, in order to
grow efficiently, they would have to abandon having card readers
installed in every car.270 Instead, renters and owners met face to face
to hand off the keys.271 The human connection led to gains for both
parties: Owners made fewer damage claims and both renters and
owners reported higher satisfaction ratings.272 As the CEO of RelayRides, Andre Haddad, stated, “People strike up a conversation
and realize they have something in common, which boosts trust and
makes people feel accountable. They’re going to have to return this
car to that person and look them in the eye.”273 For the same reasons,
Airbnb, Uber, Lyft, and many other platforms require users to have
a clear profile photo displayed with their accounts.274
In fact, any information that confirms a person’s identity
strengthens the trust and reputational ties between parties.275 That is
why many sharing services prefer people to sign up using their Facebook account, as it is linked to their real identity.276 Lyft had originally allowed riders to sign up only with a Facebook account (but
now also allows a valid cellphone number).277 The European ridesharing platform BlaBlaCar will also verify a driver’s phone number, email, and Facebook account along with real photos and
names.278 Airbnb hosts can require that their guests have a Verified
ID Badge, meaning they have verified their identity with the Airbnb
267
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platform by uploading a driver’s license or passport photo or have
connected other online accounts to their identity.279 Other items that
platforms will verify include credit cards and bank accounts. A variation of this is a quid pro quo policy where users have to share information about themselves if they want to see the same information
from others in the network.280
Finally, the ability for both users and providers of a good or service to differentiate between individuals is another powerful mechanism that has gained use in the sharing economy.281 Feastly, a platform connecting chefs willing to prepare and host a meal in their
home with consumers willing to pay for the dining experience, allows the host to accept or reject RSVPs from potential diners based
on the information they provide or on what is included in their social
network.282 Similarly, ride-sharing drivers can decide not to pick up
passengers with low ratings.283 This mechanism allows both parties
to decide with whom they want to interact.284 At the same time, they
know when they do interact with another party, both are doing so
voluntarily.285
Generally speaking, the peer-to-peer mechanisms of building
online trust and reputation in the sharing economy are very similar
to those used in the physical world.286 Unsurprisingly, they are centered on establishing an identity and increasing communication between humans.287 Cliff Lampe of the University of Michigan’s
School of Information notes that these mechanisms help establish
new social norms in the process.288 In particular, he states that “[b]y
providing feedback about behavior, penalizing negative actions, sig279
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naling desired outcomes, and rewarding users, reputation and recommender systems are providing socializing functions and becoming valuable tools for organizing online environments.”289 In addition, Lampe argues that these tools are also essential to the growth
of these environments because they both teach and enforce social
norms within these spaces.290 They also socialize new users as they
enter the system for the first time; “by providing information about
users, rating systems can act as ‘cues’ or ‘signals’ in online communities, allowing users to reach common ground about each other and
facilitating social interaction.”291In summary, there currently exists
a host of mechanisms used to enhance trust and reputation in the
sharing economy. These mechanisms continue to change and evolve
to meet the needs of both buyers and sellers. Reputational systems
have been heralded as the unsung heroes of the social Web.292 As
Chrysanthos Dellarocas notes, “In some form or another, they are
an integral part of most of today’s social web applications.”293
Reputational systems make online commerce a safer and more
secure experience.294 Some have gone so far as to regard trust and
reputational systems as security mechanisms.295 Much of this security is the result of reputational systems overcoming the information
asymmetries of the past.296 However, just as different situations call
for different security mechanisms, various sharing economy transactions call for different levels of reputational systems. People may
not need to thoroughly vet the person hired to mow the lawn, but
they will certainly seek out more information and spend much more
time reviewing a potential babysitter for their children. Thus, the
nature of the exchange oftentimes dictates the reputational systems
that individuals rely on to acquire the necessary information.297
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C. Addressing Problems Facing Reputational Mechanisms
Of course, like security measures, these feedback mechanisms
are not infallible. Critics have pointed to a number of Airbnb horror
stories where guests have abused their host’s home.298 There have
also been bad apples driving for Uber and Lyft.299 It should be noted,
however, that the vast majority of these feedback mechanisms work
well enough that worst-case scenarios are extremely rare: Airbnb
transacted approximately two million reservations successfully before it had its first bad actor that ransacked a host’s home.300 Following the incident, Airbnb doubled their support staff, offered a
24/7 helpline, and instituted a $50,000 insurance policy (which they
shortly after raised to the current $1 million policy).301 But even as
Airbnb has become much larger, host claims paid in 2013 totaled
only 700 out of approximately six million guests, a claim rate of
only 0.01 percent.302
Thus, while “there are still many problems and challenges in
both academic and practical trust/reputation systems,” experts on
modern online feedback systems have concluded that “the successful implementation of practical systems confirms the robustness of
trust/reputation mechanisms.”303 The very fact that the sharing economy has evolved to the point it has today, with millions of parties
transacting daily and having few problems, bolsters this conclusion.
There is always room for improvement, of course. In particular,
firms utilizing feedback mechanisms to facilitate commercial interactions must always be on the lookout for users trying to rig those
systems in their favor.304 As Dellarocas concludes,
In general, it is impossible to design a totally manipulation-resistant reputation system. No matter what mechanisms one puts in
298
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place, creative and determined users are bound to find a way around
them. For that reason, community administrators must constantly
monitor such systems, organically evolving their designs.305
As Paolo Massa notes, “[o]ne of the main concerns about reputation systems and trust metrics is the fact that they can be attacked
and gamed. What are often called ‘malicious users’ can hijack systems in order to get a personal advantage.”306 Then, citing specific
research, Massa notes different recommendations for addressing
these threats and for making a trust metric more attack-resistant.307
We have also noted the use of fraud-detecting algorithms above.308
Ongoing competition among existing and future online operators and sharing economy firms will encourage greater innovation
and improvements in these systems. We have already seen significant improvements in the efficiency and sophistication of feedback
mechanisms from early Internet days.309 As long as they are allowed
to, these systems will continue to evolve and solve new challenges.
Some critics of the sharing economy argue that it will exacerbate
racial tensions by making discrimination easier.310 A recent study
conducted by Harvard Business School found that nonblack Airbnb
hosts charge approximately 12 percent more than black hosts for an
equivalent rental.311 While the study focuses on discrimination of
suppliers rather than on the more traditional understanding of discrimination against consumers, the study’s authors do note that there
is evidence that the Internet has reduced racial discrimination in
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other transactions, including car prices.312 Moreover, others have
shown this to be true: The sharing economy offers more options to
underserved communities and helps overcome the problem of
bias.313 Airbnb has noted possible problems with the Harvard study,
for example, the data are two years old and from only one city out
of the 35,000 where they currently have hosts.314 In addition, as the
study itself notes, much of the price discrepancies may be driven by
differences in location.315
With regard to instances in which discrimination has in fact historically occurred, Lior Strahilevitz of the University of Chicago
School of Law argues that
an important potential upside of new reputational
tracking technologies is their potential to displace
statistical discrimination on the basis of race, gender,
age, appearance, and other easily observable characteristics. Reputation tracking tools . . . provide detailed information about individuals, thereby reducing the temptation for decision makers to rely on
group-based stereotypes.”316
But more importantly, if irrational discrimination is preventing
mutually beneficial trades within any sharing economy platform, it

312
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would create a lucrative profit opportunity for entrepreneurs to address.317 What’s more, there are already antidiscrimination laws on
the books that could be used to address these problems as they
arise.318 It is not necessary to try to alleviate discrimination problems through additional regulations focused on these valuable feedback mechanisms, whose resiliency depends on being able to adapt
organically to address new challenges.
Whether the concerns over feedback mechanisms are about biases or gaming, the relevant question is whether these mechanisms—and the sharing economy that these mechanisms allow to
flourish—improve consumer and producer welfare relative to the
past. The rise and rapid growth of the sharing economy, and the fact
that millions of people are voluntarily transacting with each other
every day in these new ways, demonstrates that both consumers and
producers are better off overall. By lowering the transaction costs
between buyers and sellers, and aided by the reputational systems
discussed above, the internet has paved the way for more trust and
cooperation.319 It is important that the perfect not become the enemy
of the good when it comes to evaluating the effectiveness of these
systems. Moreover, these systems will never reach a static endpoint; security and effectiveness are a never-ending process of refinement.320
V. POLICY RAMIFICATIONS OF THE SHARING ECONOMY AND
REPUTATIONAL FEEDBACK SYSTEMS
A. The Evaporating Rationales for Existing Regulations
The growth and combination of information sharing, product
and service review sites, and reputational feedback mechanisms present profound ramifications for public policy. While consumer protection regulations were put in place in response to perceived market
failures in the form of asymmetric information, they should be evaluated in light of their traditional effectiveness as well as changing
317
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marketplace and technological circumstances.321 In both cases, the
evidence supports policy reform.
First, traditional consumer protection regulations have not
served consumers well. As documented by Koopman, Mitchell, and
Thierer, many consumer protection regulatory regimes diminish
consumer welfare because they are “captured” by the affected interests and abused to their advantage.322 This results in barriers to entry
and innovation as well as higher prices, reduced product quality,
fewer choices, or some combination of all of the above.323 The taxicab industry is a particularly vivid example of this situation.324 Barriers to entry in the form of taxi medallions decrease competitive
forces and remove incentives to better the taxi experience for users.325
Second, the marketplace and the technological developments
documented in this paper make it clear that information markets,
reputational systems, and rapid ongoing innovation often solve
problems more efficiently than regulation, especially when they are
given a chance to do so.326 In a sense, technology has achieved what
regulation promised to accomplish—or at least should have promised to accomplish—long ago.327 Indeed, it should be noted that regulations instituted in an effort to overcome information asymmetries
involve their own costs and, in many cases, can exceed the initial
claimed benefits.328 This is especially true as industries—and markets—continue to innovate and evolve over time.329
Moreover, if asymmetric information really were as profound a
problem as some have suggested, then the most logical response
321
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would be remedies aimed at filling those information gaps and empowering consumers to make better decisions: indeed, Federal
Trade Commission officials noted as much in the early 1980s:
[T]here is usually an advantage in designing disclosure remedies
that leave as large a role as possible to normal market forces, to restrict the market as little as possible. The goal should be not to specify the exact information to be disclosed and the exact manner in
which it will be disclosed but to give sellers the proper incentives to
make these decisions on their own.330
Modern reputation tracking and feedback mechanisms, in combination with the various online review sites and information services, accomplish this objective by disclosing more information to
consumers, thus putting them in a position to make better decisions.331 Moreover, these emergent market developments ultimately
leverage the dispersed knowledge of each individual user, rather
than relying on the information that a single regulator is able to collect.332 These information-sharing systems allow individuals to provide instant feedback regarding the quality of products and services,
and they empower others to utilize this information in a way that
traditional solutions never could.333
Taken together, it should be clear that “[w]hen market circumstances change dramatically—or when new technology or competition alleviate the need for regulation—then public policy should
evolve and adapt to accommodate these new realities.”334 In addition, because these systems are constantly evolving, and because
new security challenges will always arise, it is dangerous for policymakers to impose a stagnant regulatory structure mandating certain aspects, procedures, or outcomes.335
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B. Leveling the Playing Field
Even if many traditional consumer protection regulatory regimes have failed to improve consumer welfare and are in need of
reform, both policymakers and incumbent industries will argue that
the innovators of the sharing economy are evading regulations that
are still on the books.336 Those regulations include “licensing requirements, price controls, service area requirements, marketing
limitations, and technology standards.”337
While this issue of the so-called level playing field represents a
legitimate policy problem, policymakers should not remedy it by
punishing new innovations and by simply extending old regulatory
regimes to new technologies and sectors.338 Instead, policymakers
should level the playing field by “deregulating down” to put similarly situated competitors on an equal footing, not by “regulating
up” to achieve parity.339 Older rules still faced by incumbents should
be relaxed for entire industries as new actors and new technologies
enter the market and otherwise preempt the need for the continued
application of the traditional regulatory solutions.340
Importantly, this does not mean that either new entrants or incumbents will be unregulated. Numerous legal remedies, both civil
and criminal, already exist to deal with accidents and bad behavior.341 These remedies include “private insurance, contracts,” discrimination laws, “torts, and product liability law[s].”342 The advantage of these ex post remedies is that they “do not discourage
innovation and competition the way ex ante regulation does.”343 By
trying to plan for “every hypothetical worst-case scenario, [many]
preemptive [consumer protection] regulations actually [impede]
many best-case scenarios,” and they harm consumer welfare in the
process.344
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VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has documented how the sharing economy relies
upon—and has helped spur the growth of—sophisticated reputational feedback mechanisms that facilitate online trust and commerce, overcoming many of the information asymmetries that
seemed intractable to George Akerlof and others just a generation
ago. In combination with online review services and other information-sharing technologies enabled by the Internet, these reputational tools can help create more effective, and largely self-regulating, markets that provide more information to more individuals than
ever before. However, it is unhelpful to point out shortcomings in
these systems as a justification to continue to rely solely on traditional, formal mechanisms in light of these changing circumstances.
As Strahilevitz argues,
Reputation tracking cannot and will not solve all our problems.
But neither can courts, police officers, or regulatory agencies. These
various tools of maintaining social order work in concert, and they
offer different competencies in varied contexts.345
In other words, reputational systems will not completely obviate
the need for other legal mechanisms. Nonetheless, the significance
of reputational tracking and feedback systems should not be
underestimated. Jason Tanz has observed,
[W]e are entering a new era of Internet-enabled intimacy. This
is not just an economic breakthrough. It is a cultural one, enabled by
a sophisticated series of mechanisms, algorithms, and finely
calibrated systems of rewards and punishments. It’s a radical next
step for the person-to-person marketplace pioneered by eBay: a set
of digital tools that enable and encourage us to trust our fellow
human beings.346
By facilitating greater trust while simulateously opening up new
innovations and opportunities, these new Internet-based
mechanisms promise to revolutionize modern marketplace
interactions. This should force a reevaluation of traditional
regulations aimed at addressing perceived asymmetric information
market failures, regulations that have typically failed to improve
345
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consumer welfare while also undermining innovation and
competition.

